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My primary purpose in this chapter is to
introduce, albeit briefly, some of the different
traditions within systems thinking and prac-
tice and to explore what action research (AR)
practitioners may find useful by engaging
with these traditions. 
The history of systems thinking and prac-
tice can be explained in many different ways.
Anyone can be a systems thinker and practi-
tioner, but the narratives that are told are gen-
erally about those with recognized expertise.
My perspective is that many well-known sys-
tems thinkers had particular experiences
which led them to devote their lives to their
particular forms of systems practice. So,
within systems thinking and practice, just as
in other domains of practice, there are differ-
ent traditions, which are perpetuated through
lineages.
After exploring some of these lineages I
elucidate how systemic and systematic think-
ing and practice are different – these are the
two adjectives that come from the word
‘system’ but they describe quite different
understandings and practices. These differ-
ences are associated with epistemological
awareness, which is required, I claim, for
moving effectively between systemic and
systematic thinking and practice. I ground
this claim in my own experience of doing AR
9
Systems Thinking and Practice for
Action Research
R a y  I s o n
This chapter offers some grounding in systems thinking and practice for doing action
research. There are different traditions within systems thinking and practice which, if appre-
ciated, can become part of the repertoire for practice by action researchers. After exploring
some of these lineages the differences between systemic and systematic thinking and prac-
tice are elucidated – these are the two adjectives that come from the word 'system', but they
describe quite different understandings and practices. These differences are associated with
epistemological awareness and distinguishing systemic action research from action research.
Finally, some advantages for action research practice from engaging with systems thinking
and practice are discussed. 
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which has led me to distinguish systemic
action research from action research. 
Finally, I suggest some advantages I, and
others in the systems traditions, have found
useful for AR from engaging with systems
thinking and practice.
SYSTEMS TRADITIONS AND
LINEAGES
Scene Setting
The word ‘system’ comes from the Greek
verb synhistanai, meaning ‘to stand together’
(the word ‘epistemology’ has the same root).
A system is a perceived whole whose ele-
ments are ‘interconnected’. Someone who
pays particular attention to interconnections
is said to be systemic (e.g. a systemic family
therapist is someone who considers the inter-
connections amongst the whole family; the
emerging discipline of Earth Systems
Science is concerned with the interconnec-
tions between the geological and biological
features of the Earth). On the other hand, if I
follow a recipe in a step-by step manner then
I am being systematic. Medical students in
courses on anatomy often take a systematic
approach to their study of the human body –
the hand, leg, internal organs etc. – but at the
end of their study they may have very little
understanding of the body as a whole
because the whole is different to the sum of
the parts, i.e. the whole has emergent proper-
ties (Table 9.1). Later I explain how starting off
systemically to attempt to change or improve
situations of complexity and uncertainty
means being both systemic and systematic.
Many, but not all, people have some form
of systemic awareness, even though they
may be unaware of the intellectual history of
systems thinking and practice as a field of
practical and academic concern. Systemic
awareness comes from understanding: 
(i) ‘cycles’, such as the cycle between life and
death, various nutrient cycles and the water
cycle – the connections between rainfall, plant
growth, evaporation, flooding, run-off,
percolation etc. Through this sort of systemic
logic water availability for plant growth can ulti-
mately be linked to the milk production of graz-
ing animals and such things as profit and other
human motivations. Sometimes an awareness of
connectivity is described in the language of
chains, as in ‘the food chain’, and sometimes as
networks, as in the ‘web of life’. Other phrases
include ‘joined up’, ‘linked’, ‘holistic’, ‘whole sys-
tems’, ‘complex adaptive systems’ etc;
(ii) counterintuitive effects, such as realizing that
floods can represent times when you need to
be even more careful about conserving water,
as exemplified by the shortages of drinking
water in the New Orleans floods that followed
hurricane Katrina in 2005; and 
(iii) unintended consequences. Unintended conse-
quences are not always knowable in advance
but thinking about things systemically can
often minimize them. They may arise because
feedback processes (i.e. positive and negative
feedback) are not appreciated (Table 9.1). For
example the designers of England’s motorways
did not plan for what is now experienced on a
daily basis – congestion, traffic jams, emis-
sions, etc. These unintended consequences are
a result of the gaps in thinking that went into
designing and building new motorways as part
of a broader ‘transport system’.
As I intimated earlier, many people either
implicitly or explicitly refer to things that are
interconnected (exhibit connectivity – Table
9.1) when they use the word ‘system’. A com-
mon example is the use of ‘transport system’or
‘computer system’ in everyday speech. As well
as a set of interconnected ‘things’ (elements), a
‘system’ can also be seen as a way of thinking
about the connections (relationships) between
things – hence a process. A constraint to think-
ing about ‘system’ as an entity and a process is
caused by the word ‘system’ being a noun – a
noun implies something you can see, touch or
discover, but in contemporary systems think-
ing more attention is paid to the process of
‘formulating’ a system as depicted in Figure
9.1. This figure shows someone who has
formulated or distinguished a system of inter-
est in a situation, i.e. a process. In the process
a boundary judgement is made which
distinguishes a system of interest from an
140
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Table 9.1 Definitions of some generalized systems concepts likely to be experienced when encountering a system practitioner
or for co-option into your own action research projects
Concept Definition
Boundary The borders of the system, determined by the observer(s), which define where control action can be taken: a particular area of responsibility to achieve system purposes
Communication (i) First-order communication is based on simple feedback (as in a thermostat) but should not be confused with human communication, which has
a biological basis
(ii) Second-order communication is understood from a theory of cognition which encompasses language, emotion, perception and behaviour. Amongst human beings
this gives rise to new properties in the communicating partners who each have different experiential histories
Connectivity Logical dependence between components or elements (including sub-systems) within a system
Difficulty A situation considered as a bounded and well defined problem where it is assumed that it is clear who is involved and what would constitute a solution within a
given time frame
Emergent properties Properties which are revealed at a particular level of organization and which are not possessed by constituent sub-systems. Thus these properties emerge from an
assembly of sub-systems
Environment That which is outside the system boundary and which affects and is affected by the behaviour of the system; alternatively the ‘context’ for a system of interest
Feedback A form of interconnection, present in a wide range of systems. Feedback may be negative (compensatory or balancing) or positive (exaggerating or reinforcing)
Hierarchy Layered structure; the location of a particular system within a continuum of levels of organization. This means that any system is at the same time a sub-system of
some wider system and is itself a wider system to its sub-systems
Measure of performance The criteria against which the system is judged to have achieved its purpose. Data collected according to measures of performance are used to modify the
interactions within the system
Mess A mess is a set of conditions that produces dissatisfaction. It can be conceptualized as a system of problems or opportunities; a problem or an opportunity is an
ultimate element abstracted from a mess
Monitoring and control Data collected and decisions taken in relation to measures of performance are monitored and controlled action is taken through some avenue of management
Networks An elaboration of the concept of hierarchy which avoids the human projection of ‘above’ and ‘below’ and recognizes an assemblage of entities in relationship, e.g.
organisms in an ecosystem
Perspective A way of experiencing which is shaped by our unique personal and social histories, where experiencing is a cognitive act
(Continued)
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Table 9.1 (Continued)
Concept Definition
Purpose What the system does or exists for; the raison d’être which in terms of a model developed by people is to achieve the particular transformation
that has been defined
Resources Elements which are available within the system boundary and which enable the transformation to occur
System An integrated whole whose essential properties arise from the relationships between its parts; from the Greek synhistanai, meaning ‘to place together’
System of interest The product of distinguishing a system in a situation, in relation to an articulated purpose, in which an individual or a group has an interest (a stake); a constructed or
formulated system, of interest to one or more people, used in a process of inquiry; a term suggested to avoid confusion with the everyday use of the word ‘system’
Systemic thinking The understanding of a phenomenon within the context of a larger whole; to understand things systemically literally means to put them into
a context, to establish the nature of their relationships
Systematic thinking Thinking which is connected with parts of a whole but in a linear, step-by-step manner
Tradition Literally, a network of pre-understandings or prejudices from which we think and act; how we make sense of our world
Transformation Changes, modelled as an interconnected set of activities which convert an input to an output which may leave the system (a ‘product’) or become
an input to another transformation
Trap A way of thinking which is inappropriate for the situation or issue being explored
Worldview That view of the world which enables each observer to attribute meaning to what is observed (sometimes the German word Weltanschauung is
used synonymously)
(Source: adapted from Wilson, 1984; Capra, 1996; and Pearson and Ison, 1997)
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environment. It follows that because we each
have different perspectives and interests (histo-
ries) then it is likely that we will make differ-
ent boundary judgements in the same situation,
i.e. my education system will be different to
yours because we see different elements, con-
nections and boundary. Contemporary systems
practice is concerned with overcoming the lim-
itations of the everyday use of the word
‘system’ as well as seeing the process of for-
mulating systems of interest as a form of prac-
tice that facilitates changes in understanding,
practice and situations. 
Systems thinking embraces a wide range
of concepts which most systems lineages
have as a common grounding (Table 9.1).
Thus, like other academic areas, ‘systems’
has its own language, as shown in Table 9.1.
At this point it is worth noting that I have
already used the word ‘system’ in a number
of different ways: (i) the everyday sense
when we refer to the ‘problem with the
system’; (ii) a ‘system’ of interest which is
the product of a process of formulating or
constructing by someone (Figure 9.1); (iii)
the academic area of study called ‘systems’
and (iv) a systems approach – practice or
thinking which encompasses both systemic
and systematic thinking and action.
I now provide a brief overview of the
history of systems thinking and practice which
gives rise to the traditions of understanding
out of which systemists think and act. This
account is by no means comprehensive and
reflects my own perspective on this history. 
HISTORY AND OUR TRADITIONS OF
UNDERSTANDING
Some historical accounts of systems lineages
start with the concerns of organismic biolo-
gists who felt that the reductionist thinking
and practice of other biologists was losing
sight of phenomena associated with whole
organisms (von Bertalanffy, 1968 [1940]).
Organismic or systemic biologists were
amongst those who contributed to the inter-
disciplinary project described as ‘general
systems theory’ (GST; von Bertalanffy, 1968
[1940]). Interestingly, ‘systemic biology’ is
currently enjoying a resurgence (O’Malley
and Dupré, 2005). Other historical accounts
start earlier – with Smuts’ (1926) notion of
practical holism – or even earlier with process
thinkers such as Heraclitus who is reputed to
have said: ‘You cannot step into the same
river twice, for fresh waters are ever flowing
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A distinction made
by someone
System of
Interest
Sub-system
Environment
Key elements that result from systems thinking.
Boundary
Figure 9.1 Key elements of systems practice as a process which result from systems thinking
within situations experienced as complex
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Figure 9.2 A model of different influences that have shaped contemporary systems approaches
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in upon you.’ Figure 9.2 gives an account of
some of the influences that have given rise to
contemporary systems approaches. Other
historical accounts can be found in
Checkland (1981), Flood (1999, 2001/2006),
Francois (1997), Jackson (2000) or on
Principia Cybernetica (2006).
In Figure 9.2 I identify five formative clus-
ters that give rise to contemporary systems
approaches. It is not possible to describe all
these influences nor approaches in detail.
Some of the motivation for the ‘GST project’
in interdisciplinary synthesis can be explained
by the realization in many disciplines that they
were grappling with similar phenomena. This
project had its apotheosis in the interdiscipli-
nary Macy conferences in the 1940s and 1950s
which did much to trigger new insights of a
systems and cybernetic nature and subse-
quently a wide range of theoretical and practi-
cal developments (see Heims, 1991). So,
although GST, as an intellectual project, has
not been sustained it has nonetheless left a rich
legacy (Capra, 1996). 
For example, Checkland (1981: 152) estab-
lishes a connection with Kurt Lewin’s view of
‘the limitations of studying complex real
social events in a laboratory, the artificiality of
splitting out single behavioural elements from
an integrated system’ (see also Foster, 1972).
Checkland goes on to say: ‘this outlook obvi-
ously denotes a systems thinker, though
Lewin did not overtly identify himself as
such’ (p. 152). A central idea in Lewin’s
milieu was that psychological phenomena
should be regarded as existing in a ‘field’: ‘as
part of a system of coexisting and mutually
interdependent factors having certain proper-
ties as a system that are deducible from
knowledge of isolated elements of the system’
(Deutsch and Krauss, 1965, quoted in Sofer,
1972). Whilst Lewin may not have overtly
described himself as a systems thinker, he was
nonetheless a member of the Macy confer-
ences ‘core group’. He attended the first two
conferences but died in 1947, shortly before
the third conference, and his influence was
lost to the group (especially his knowledge of
Gestalt psychology).1
The next two clusters (Figure 9.2) are
associated with cybernetics, from the Greek
meaning ‘helmsman’ or ‘steersman’. The
term was coined to deal with concerns about
feedback as exemplified by the person at the
helm responding to wind and currents so as
to stay on course. A key image of first-order
cybernetics is that of the thermostat-con-
trolled radiator – when temperatures deviate
from the optimum, feedback processes adjust
the heat to maintain the desired temperature.
Major concerns of cyberneticians were that
of communication and control (Table 9.1). As
outlined by Fell and Russell (2000), the first-
order cybernetic ‘idea of communication as
the transmission of unambiguous signals
which are codes for information has been
found wanting in many respects. Heinz von
Foerster, reflecting on the reports he edited
for the Macy Conferences that were so influ-
ential in developing communication theory
in the 1950s, said it was an unfortunate lin-
guistic error to use the word ‘information’
instead of ‘signal’ because the misleading
‘idea of ‘information transfer’ has held up
progress in this field (Capra, 1996). In the
latest theories the biological basis of the lan-
guage we use has become a central theme’
(see first- and second-order communication
in Table 9.1).
Fell and Russell (2000: 34) go on to
describe the emergence of second-order
cybernetics in the following terms: ‘second-
order cybernetics is a theory of the observer
rather than what is being observed. Heinz
von Foerster’s phrase, “the cybernetics of
cybernetics” was apparently first used by
him in the early 1960s as the title of Margaret
Mead’s opening speech at the first meeting of
the American Cybernetics Society when she
had not provided written notes for the
Proceedings (van der Vijver, 1997)’. 
The move from first- to second-order
cybernetics is a substantial philosophical and
epistemological jump as it returns to the core
cybernetic concept of ‘circularity’, or recur-
sion, by recognizing that observers bring forth
their worlds (Maturana and Poerkson, 2004;
Von Foerster and Poerkson, 2004). Von
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Foerster (1992), following Wittgenstein, put
the differences in the following terms: ‘Am I
apart from the universe? That is, whenever I
look am I looking through a peephole upon an
unfolding universe [the first-order tradition].
Or: Am I part of the universe? That is, when-
ever I act, I am changing myself and the uni-
verse as well [the second-order tradition]’
(p. 15). He goes on to say that ‘Whenever I
reflect upon these two alternatives, I am sur-
prised again and again by the depth of the
abyss that separates the two fundamentally
different worlds that can be created by such a
choice: Either to see myself as a citizen of an
independent universe, whose regularities,
rules and customs I may eventually discover,
or to see myself as the participant in a con-
spiracy whose customs, rules and regulations
we are now inventing’ (p. 15). It is worth mak-
ing the point that understandings from second-
order cybernetics have been influential in
fields as diverse as family therapy and envi-
ronmental management. Some authors equate
a second order cybernetic tradition with radi-
cal constructivism, although not all agree. 
Operations research (OR) is another
source of influence on contemporary systems
thinking and practice. OR flourished after the
Second World War based on the success of
practitioners in studying and managing com-
plex logistic problems. As a disciplinary field
it has continued to evolve in ways that are
mirrored in the systems community. 
A recent set of influences have come from
the so-called complexity sciences (Figure 9.2),
which is a lively arena of competing and con-
tested discourses. As has occurred between the
different systems lineages, there are competing
claims within the complexity field for institu-
tional capital (e.g. many different academic
societies have been formed with little relation-
ship to each other), contested explanations
and extensive epistemological confusion
(Schlindwein and Ison, 2005). However, some
are drawing on both traditions to forge exciting
new forms of praxis (e.g. McKenzie, 2006).
Other recent developments draw on inter-
disciplinary movements in the sciences,
especially in science studies. These include
the rise of discourses and understandings
about the ‘risk’ and ‘networked’ society
(Beck, 1992; Castells, 2004), and associated
globalization which has raised awareness of
situations characterized by connectedness,
complexity, uncertainty, conflict, multiple
perspectives and multiple stakeholdings
(SLIM, 2004a). It can be argued that this is
the reformulation and transformation of an
earlier discourse about the nature of situa-
tions that Ackoff (1974) described as
‘messes’ rather than ‘difficulties’ (Table 9.1),
Shön (1995) as the ‘real-life swamp’ rather
than the ‘high-ground of technical rationality’,
and Rittel and Webber (1973) as ‘wicked’ and
‘tame’ problems. A tame problem is one
where all the parties involved can agree what
the problem is ahead of the analysis and
which does not change during the analysis.
In contrast, a wicked problem is ill-defined.
Nobody agrees about what, exactly, the
problem is. Schön, Ackoff and Rittel all had
professional backgrounds in planning so it is
not surprising that they encountered the same
phenomena even if they chose to describe
them differently. 
An example of such a situation from my
own work is that of water catchments; a
‘catchment’ (or watershed) has been histori-
cally regarded as a description of a biophys-
ical entity, but today there are few
catchments which do not have mixed forms
of human activity (urban development, farm-
ing, extraction, mining etc.) interacting with bio-
physical or ecosystem functions. Catchments
could thus be said to be socially constructed.
On a global basis there is a shortage of water
in relation to human-derived demands and
often the quality of water available is no
longer fit for purpose. In such situations
more scientific knowledge can increase,
rather than ameliorate, complexity and
uncertainty, yet there is also a need to ‘man-
age’ catchments. This is the type of situation
where systems thinking and practice and AR
come together most fruitfully (SLIM,
2004a). 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR ACTION
RESEARCHERS
Developments in systems thinking and prac-
tice have gone on in parallel – sometimes
with mutual influences, sometimes in
isolation – with other academic trends such
as the emergence of discourse theory or
post-structuralism or concerns with reflexiv-
ity, to name but a few. This should not pose
problems for action researchers, rather it
should offer more choices for practice.
Awareness of the different systems tradi-
tions, the praxes that have evolved, their
constituent concepts (e.g. Table 9.1) and the
techniques, tools and methods that are used
are all available for an action researcher to
enhance their own repertoire.
One of the key concepts in systems is that
of levels or layered structure (Table 9.1); this
concept illuminates an important aspect of
systems practice, the conscious movement
between different levels of abstraction. In the
next section I explore how it is possible, with
awareness, to move between the systemic
and systematic.
Not all the systems approaches depicted in
Figure 9.2 have been influenced by the dis-
tinctions I have made; each has tended to
focus on particular key systemic concerns,
e.g. patterns of influence and the dynamics of
stocks and flows in systems dynamics; criti-
cal theory and Habermasian understandings
in critical systems approaches; phenomenol-
ogy and interpretivism in applied ‘soft sys-
tems’, to name but a few. Those within each
approach have generally evolved their own
forms of praxis. Engagement with the differ-
ent systems traditions also requires an ability
to make epistemological distinctions – to be
epistemologically aware. I explain why this
is important in the next section.
SYSTEMIC AND SYSTEMATIC
THINKING AND ACTION
Exploring the Systemic/Systematic
Distinction
When Checkland and his co-workers, begin-
ning in the late 1960s, reacted against the
thinking then prevalent in systems engineer-
ing and operations research (two lineages
depicted in Figure 9.2), and coined the terms
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ systems (Table 9.2), the case
for epistemological awareness within sys-
tems began to be made apparent. 
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Table 9.2 The ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ traditions of systems thinking compared
The hard systems thinking tradition The soft systems thinking tradition
oriented to goal seeking oriented to learning
assumes the world contains systems that can be engineered assumes the world is problematical but can be explored by
using system models
assumes system models to be models of the world assumes system models to be intellectual constructs
(ontologies) (epistemologies)
talks the language of ‘problem’ and ‘solutions’ talks the language of ‘issues’ and ‘accommodations’
Advantages Advantages
allows the use of powerful techniques is available to all stakeholders including professional
practitioners; keeps in touch with the human content of
problem situations
Disadvantages Disadvantages
may lose touch with aspects beyond the logic of does not produce the final answers;
the problem situation accepts that inquiry is never-ending
(Adapted from Checkland, 1985)
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Systems practitioners, such as Checkland,
found the thinking associated with goal-
oriented behaviour to be unhelpful when deal-
ing with messes and this resulted in a move
away from goal-oriented thinking towards
thinking in terms of learning, i.e. the purpose
of formulating a system of interest as depicted
in Figure 9.1 moves from naming, describing
or discovering systems to orchestrating a
process of learning which can lead to changes
in understandings and practices. The episte-
mological shift was from seeing systems as
‘real world entities’ to models or devices
employed in a process of action learning or
research, i.e. the primary skill shifted to one of
being able to build and use systemic models as
epistemological devices to facilitate learning
and change based on accommodations
between different interests. ‘Hard’ systems
approaches had typically been used within the
lineage of ‘systems engineering’ which when
it came to building bridges was fine, but when
these people turned their attention to social
issues it was not so easy to engineer new
‘social systems’ – in fact it proved dangerous
to do so, with significant unintended conse-
quences (a recent example is the attempt by
the New Labour government in the UK to
‘engineer’ performance based on targets). 
In our work at the Open University, driven
by the need to develop effective pedagogy for
educating the systems practitioner, we have
rejected the hard/soft distinction because we
experience it as perpetuating an unhelpful
dualism – a self negating either/or. This is
manifest, particularly among technology and
engineering students, as ‘hard approaches’
(often quantitative) being perceived as more
rigorous than ‘soft’. Instead we employ the
adjectives that arise from the word system:
systemic thinking, thinking in terms of wholes
and systematic thinking, linear, step-by-step
thinking, as described earlier. Likewise, it is
possible to recognize systemic practice and
systematic practice. Together these comprise a
duality – a whole rather than an unhelpful
dualism (the Chinese symbol for yin and yang
is a depiction of a duality – together they make
a whole). Table 9.3 summarizes some of the
characteristics that distinguish between
systemic and systematic thinking and action.
The construction of Table 9.3 may suggest
that the systemic and systematic are either/or
choices. Historically, for many, they appear to
have been. However, the capacity to practise
both systemically and systematically gives
rise to more choices if one is able to act with
awareness. Awareness requires attempting to
know the traditions of understanding out of
which we think and act, including the extent
of our epistemological awareness. I also refer
to this as the ‘as if’ attitude, e.g. the choice can
be made to act ‘as if’ it were possible to be
‘objective’ or to see ‘systems’ as real. Such
awareness allows questions like: What will I
learn about this situation if I regard it as a
system to do X or Y? Or if you are a biologist,
asking: How might I understand this organism
if I choose to understand it as a system?
Adopting an ‘as if’ approach means that one is
always aware of the observer who gives rise to
the distinctions that are made and the respon-
sibility we each have in this regard. The sys-
temic and systematic distinctions can be
linked to the different traditions in systems –
the systematic is akin to the first-order cyber-
netic tradition and the systemic builds on
second-order traditions (Figure 9.2). Being
able to work within both the systemic and sys-
tematic traditions is only possible with episte-
mological awareness.
My systemic and systematic distinctions
extend the conclusions of Dent and Umpleby
(1998) in their analysis of the underlying
assumptions of systems and cybernetic tradi-
tions; they regard ‘systems and cybernetics’
as a collective worldview in which one strand
is emerging with major assumptions about
constructivism, mutual causation and holism
and a traditional worldview comprising major
assumptions of objectivism, linear causation
and reductionism. 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL AWARENESS
Epistemology is the study of how we come
to know; within second-order cybernetics
148
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Table 9.3 A summary of the characteristics that distinguish the epistemological basis of systemic thinking and action and
systematic thinking and action
Systemic thinking
Properties of the whole differ and are said to emerge from their
parts, e.g. the wetness of water cannot be understood in terms
of hydrogen and oxygen.
Boundaries of systems are determined by the perspectives of
those who participate in formulating them. The result is a
system of interest.
Individuals hold partial perspectives of the whole; when
combined, these provide multiple partial perspectives.
Systems are characterized by feedback – may be negative, i.e.
compensatory or balancing; or positive, i.e. exaggerating or
reinforcing.
Systems cannot be understood by analysis of the component
parts. The properties of the parts are not intrinsic properties, but
can be understood only within the context of the larger whole
through studying the interconnections.
Concentrates on basic principles of organization.
Systems are nested within other systems – they are
multi-layered and interconnect to form networks.
Contextual.
Concerned with process.
The properties of the whole system are destroyed when the
system is dissected, either physically or theoretically, into
isolated elements.
Some implications for AR
The whole can be understood by considering just
the parts through linear cause–effect mechanisms.
Systems exist as concrete entities; there is a
correspondence between the description and the
described phenomenon.
Perspective is not important.
Analysis is linear.
A situation can be understood by step-by-step
analysis followed by evaluation and repetition of
the original analysis.
Concentrates on basic building blocks.
There is a foundation on which the parts can
be understood.
Analytical.
Concerned with entities and properties.
The system can be reconstructed after studying the
components.
Some implications for AR
It is helpful to surface understandings about causality
amongst participants in AR projects – using multiple cause
diagramming is one way to do this; a choice can be made to
see AR as a process of managing for emergence or to meet
predetermined goals.
Awareness and choice are key concerns; awareness of the
limitations of the everyday use of the word ‘system’ can help
practice, especially surfacing boundary judgements.
Has implications for who participates in AR and how different
perspectives are managed in the process of AR.
Draws attention to the dynamics in a situation and how these
may be understood differently by different participants. Need
to avoid confusion between the (now) everyday notion of
feedback and how it is understood cybernetically (Table 9.1)
For AR both have their place – it is useful to be aware of
when and why it might be useful to begin, or act,
systemically or systematically; starting off systemically will
usually take you to a different place than starting off
systematically.
Involves shifting between process thinking and thinking in
terms of objects or entities e.g. how do objects arise?  What
are relationships between entities?
Involve different ways of thinking about relationships.
Lead to different starting points and processes.
Both are relevant to AR.
May have implications for project managing in AR or how a
study is set up.
(Continued)
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Table 9.3 (Continued)
(Adapted from Ison and Russell, 2000)
Systemic thinking
The espoused role and the action of the decision-maker is very
much part of an interacting ecology of systems. How the
researcher perceives the situation is critical to the system being
studied.
Ethics are perceived as being multi-levelled as are the levels, of
systems themselves. What might be good at one level might be
bad at another. Responsibility replaces objectivity in whole-
systems ethics.
It is the interaction of the practitioner and a system of interest
with its context (its environment) that is the main focus of
exploration and change.
Perception and action are based on experience of the world,
especially on the experience of patterns that connect entities
and the meaning generated by viewing events in their contexts.
There is an attempt to stand back and explore the traditions of
understanding in which the practitioner is immersed.
Some implications for AR
The espoused role of the decision-maker is that of
participant-observer. In practice, however, the
decision-maker claims to be objective and thus remains
'outside' the system being studied.
Ethics and values are not addressed as a central theme.
They are not integrated into the change process; the
researcher takes an objective stance.
The system being studied is seen as distinct from its
environment. It may be spoken of in open-system
terms but intervention is performed as though it were a
closed system.
Perception and action are based on a belief in a 'real
world', a world of discrete entities that have meaning
in and of themselves.
Traditions of understanding may not be questioned
although the method of analysis may be evaluated.
Some implications for AR
In systemic action the AR role is that of participant-
conceptualizer or co-conceptualizer; in systematic AR concern
is primarily with understanding the action of others.
It is not possible to reconcile ‘objectivity’ with ethicality and
responsibility in the doing of AR – they belong to different
traditions (not to be confused with doing some things
systematically within a systemic framing).
It is possible to think of all AR projects ‘as if’ they were
systems to do ….; this would be a systemic approach
whereas a systematic position might see an AR project ‘as a’
system.
An awareness of epistemology is important to carry in AR
practice.
The AR practitioner is part of the situation and calls for a
reflexive attitude
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knowledge is not something we have but
arises in social relations such that all know-
ing is doing. From this perspective episte-
mology is something practical that is part of
daily life. It is known (Perry, 1981; Salner,
1986) that personal change in epistemic
assumptions is absolutely essential to any
major breakthroughs in decision-making
based on understanding and applying sys-
tems theories to practical problems. If, as
Salner has found, many people are not able to
fully grasp relatively simple systemic con-
cepts (such as non-linear processes, or self-
reflexive structures), they will not be able to
rethink organizational dynamics in terms of
‘managing’ complexity without substantial
alteration in the worldviews (their ‘applied’
epistemology). 
Salner (1986), drawing on earlier work by
Perry (1970, 1981) and Kitchener (1983),
describes the prevailing theory on epistemic
learning as involving the deliberate breaking
down and restructuring of mental models that
support worldviews. She acknowledges that
this is not easy. Prigogine provides an addi-
tional lens on this theory in his discussion of
‘dissipative structures’ (Prigogine and
Stengers, 1994). This theory provides a
model of the dynamics of epistemic learning:
each learner goes through a period of chaos,
confusion and being overwhelmed by com-
plexity before new conceptual information
brings about a spontaneous restructuring of
mental models at a higher level of complex-
ity, thereby allowing a learner to understand
concepts that were formally opaque. The
shifts in understanding that concern these
authors require circumstances in which there
is genuine openness to the situation rather
than a commitment to the conservation of a
theory, explanation or epistemological posi-
tion (e.g. objectivity) which is abstracted
from the situation. Above all else it requires
awareness that we each have an epistemol-
ogy (or possibly multiple epistemologies).
Tensions and conflicts that arise in AR prac-
tice can often be attributed to differences in
epistemology, although this cause may not be
acknowledged or practitioners may not even
have the language to speak about it. A key
component of AR projects is often some form
of experiential learning – the Kolb (1983)
learning cycle is often held up as an exemplar
of an action research approach – but rarely is
‘experience’ understood in theoretical terms.
Within the second-order tradition, experience
arises in the act of making a distinction. Thus,
another way of describing a tradition is as our
experiential history. To do this requires lan-
guage – if we did not ‘live in’ language we
would simply exist in a continuous present, not
‘having experiences’. Because of language we
are able to reflect on what is happening, or in
other words we create an object of what is hap-
pening and name it ‘experience’ (Helme, 2002;
Maturana and Varela, 1987; Meynell, 2003,
2005; Von Foerster, 1984).
USING THE SYSTEMIC/SYSTEMATIC
DISTINCTIONS IN ACTION RESEARCH
The example I use is a project working with
stakeholders in the semi-arid pastoral zone of
New South Wales, Australia (Ison and
Russell, 2000). We used our understanding of
systems thinking and systemic action research
(AR based in the systemic understandings
depicted in Table 9.3) to develop an approach
to doing R&D (research and development)
relevant to the context of the lives of pastoral-
ists in semi-arid Australia. Our experience
had been that many action researchers, whilst
espousing a systemic epistemology, often in
practice privileged a systematic epistemology
without awareness that that was what they
were doing, i.e. in practice they wished to
conserve the notion of a fixed reality and the
possibility of being objective (Table 9.3). 
An outcome of our project was the design
of a process to enable pastoralists to pursue
their own R&D activities – as opposed to
having someone else’s R&D outcomes
imposed on them. Our design was built
around the notion that, given the right expe-
riences, people’s enthusiasms for action
could be triggered in such a way that those
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with similar enthusiasms might work
together. We understood enthusiasm as:
• a biological driving force (enthusiasm comes
from the Greek meaning ‘the god within’. Our
use of ‘god’ in this context has no connection
with organized religion – our position was to
question the commonly held notion that ‘infor-
mation’ comes from outside ourselves rather
than from within in response to non-specific trig-
gers from the environment);
• an emotion, which when present led to purpose-
ful action;
• a theoretical notion;
• a methodology – a way to orchestrate purpose-
ful action.
We spent a lot of time designing a process
that we thought had a chance to trigger
people’s enthusiasms. Our process did in fact
enable people’s enthusiasms to be surfaced
and led to several years of R&D activity on
the part of some pastoralists, supported by
ourselves but never determined by us (see
Dignam and Major, 2000, for an account by
the pastoralists of what they did). The
process we designed did not lead to R&D
actions (purposeful activity) in any cause and
effect way, rather the purposeful activity
taken was an emergent property of people’s
participation in the systemic, experiential
learning process that we had designed. Our
work has led to a four-stage model for doing
systemic action research grounded in
second-order cybernetic understandings
(Figure 9.2). In summary these were:
(i) Stage 1: Bringing the system of interest into
existence (i.e., naming the system of interest);
(ii) Stage 2: Evaluating the effectiveness of the
system of interest as a vehicle to elicit useful
understanding (and acceptance) of the social
and cultural context;
(iii) Stage 3: Generation of a joint decision-making
process (a ‘problem-determined system of inter-
est’) involving all key stakeholders;
(iv) Stage 4: Evaluating the effectiveness of the deci-
sions made (i.e., how has the action taken been
judged by stakeholders?).
The way we went about designing the
process (i.e of doing each stage) is described
in detail in Russell and Ison (2000). The
enactment of the four stages requires aware-
ness of the systemic/systematic distinctions
in action, i.e. as practice unfolds – they are
not just abstracted descriptions of traditions.
Our experience is that this is not easy as our
early patterning predisposes us to take
responsibility for someone else (tell them
what to do), to resort to an assumption about
a fixed reality and to forget that my world is
always different from your world. We never
have a common experience because even
though we may have the same processes of
perceiving and conceptualizing it is biologi-
cally impossible to have a shared experience –
all we have in common is language (in its
broadest sense) with which to communicate
about our experience.
From my perspective systems thinking
and practice are a means to orchestrate a par-
ticular type of conversation where conversa-
tion, from the Latin, con versare, means to
‘turn together’ as in a dance. To engage, or
not, with systems thinking and practice is a
choice we can make.
SOME ADVANTAGES FROM
ENGAGING WITH SYSTEMS
THINKING AND PRACTICE FOR AR
Many action researchers, including Kurt
Lewin, have been influenced by systems
thinking, but what is not always clear is the
extent to which this is done purposefully –
with awareness of the different theoretical
and practical lineages depicted in Figure 9.2.
I have already suggested that engaging with
systems offers a set of conceptual tools
which can be used to good effect in AR (e.g.
Table 9.1). There are other potential advan-
tages for AR practitioners. Firstly, systemic
understandings enable reflections on the
nature of research practice, including AR
practice itself. This, I suggest, can be under-
stood by exploring purpose (Table 9.1).
Secondly, there is a rich literature of how dif-
ferent systems approaches or methodologies,
including systems tools and techniques, have
been employed within AR projects to bring
about practical benefits for those involved (e.g.
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Checkland and Poulter, 2006). I explore some
of these potential benefits in this final section. 
Researching in Action Research
The distinctions between what constitutes
research (within the phrase systemic action
research or action research) and how it might
be differentiated from ‘inquiry’ or ‘managing’
is, I suggest, contested.2 AR has been a concern
within the ‘applied systems’lineage (Figure 9.2)
for over 30 years (Checkland and Holwell,
1998a); within this lineage Holwell (2004)
proposes three concepts that constitute action
research as legitimate research: recoverability,
iteration, and the purposeful articulation of
research themes (Figure 9.3). She exemplifies
her claims with a description of ‘a program of
action research with the prime research objec-
tive of understanding the … nature of the con-
tracting relationship [within the UK National
Health Service] with a view to defining how it
could be improved’ (p. 5). The project was
‘complex in execution, including several pro-
jects overlapping in time’ covering work from
different bodies of knowledge, and was under-
taken by a seven-member multidisciplinary
team with different intellectual traditions. The
issues explored crossed many organizational
boundaries; the work was done over a four-
year period and followed a three-part purpose-
ful but emergent design (Checkland and
Holwell, 1998b). 
Within the Checkland and Holwell lineage
they emphasize that the research process must: 
(i) be recoverable by interested outsiders – ‘the set of
ideas and the process in which they are used
methodologically must be stated, because these
are the means by which researchers and others
make sense of the research’ (Holwell, 2004: 355);
(ii) involve the researcher’s interests embodied in
themes which are not necessarily derived from a
specific context. ‘Rather, they are the longer
term, broader set of questions, puzzles, and top-
ics that motivate the researcher [and] such
research interests are rarely confined to one-off
situations’ (Holwell, 2004: 355) (I assume here
they might also claim that themes can arise
through a process of co-research or ‘researching
with’ – see McClintock, Ison and Armson (2003) –
and thus can be emergent as well);
(iii) involve iteration, which is a key feature of rigor,
something more complex than repetitions of a
cycle through stages ‘if thought of in relation to
a set of themes explored over time through sev-
eral different organizational contexts’ (Holwell,
2004: 356); and 
(iv) involve the ‘articulation of an epistemology in
terms of which what will count as knowledge
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Figure 9.3 The cycle of action research based on a declared framework of ideas (F) and
methodology (M) and area of application (A) and articulated research themes
(Source: Holwell, 2004, following Checkland and Holwell 1998)
Reason & Bradbury (2e)-3562-Ch-09.qxd  9/24/2007  5:29 PM  Page 153
GROUNDINGS
from the research will be expressed’ (Checkland
and Holwell, 1998b: 9). They further claim that
the ‘literature has so far shown an inadequate
appreciation of the need for a declared episte-
mology and hence a recoverable research
process’ (p. 20). Likewise Russell (1986) claimed
that what was lacking in almost all research
calling itself action research was an adequate
and thus useful epistemology.
What is at issue here are the differences
between what I have called big ‘R’ (a particular
form of purposeful human activity) and
little ‘r’ research (something that is part of daily
life, as is learning or adopting a ‘researching or
inquiring’ attitude) although the boundaries are
not always clear. Take recoverability. How in
practice is this achieved? The most common
form is to write an account of what has hap-
pened, ensuring that certain elements of prac-
tice and outcome, including evidence, are
described (e.g. FMA in Figure 9.3). But writing
is itself a form of purposeful practice, done well
or not well as the case may be, which is always
abstracted from the situation – it is always a
reflection on action and is never the same as the
actual doing. Of course recoverability could be
achieved by other means – by participation (i.e.
apprenticeship and the evolution of ‘craft’
knowledge) or through narrative, which may or
may not be writing. It seems to me the key aspi-
ration of recoverability is to create the circum-
stances where an explanation is accepted (by
yourself or someone else) and as such to pro-
vide evidence of taking responsibility for the
explanations we offer. It has a ‘could I follow a
similar path when I encounter a similar situa-
tion’ quality about it. The alternative, as Von
Foerster (1992) puts it, is to avoid responsibil-
ity and claim correspondence with some exter-
nal or transcendental reality. For me the core
concerns for AR practice are: (i) awareness; (ii)
emotioning; and (iii) purposefulness. 
In my own case I came to action research
through my awareness that my traditional disci-
pline-based research was not addressing what I
perceived to be the ‘real issues’ – in terms ele-
gantly described by Shön (1995), I had a crisis
of relevance and rejected the high ground of
technical rationality for the swamp of real-life
issues. Warmington (1980) was a major initial
influence but my purpose was to do more rele-
vant big ‘R’ research – for which I sought and
successfully gained funding (Potts and Ison,
1987). It was during subsequent work on the
CARR (Community Approaches to Rangelands
Research) project, as reported in Ison and
Russell (2000), that my own epistemological
awareness shifted – something that I claim is
necessary for the shift from action to systemic
action research (Table 9.3). My experience is
that such a shift has an emotional basis; thus the
researcher can be seen as both chorographer
(one versed in the systemic description of situ-
ations) and choreographer (one practised in the
design of dance arrangements) of the emotions
(Russell and Ison, 2005). 
As acknowledged in the distinctions
between participatory action research and
action science (Agyris and Schön, 1991; Dash,
1997) and first, second and third person
inquiry (Reason, 2001), there is a need to be
clear as to who takes responsibility for bring-
ing forth a researching system. Any account of
big ‘R’ research needs to ask the question. who
is the researcher at this moment in this con-
text? Is it me, us or them? Answers to this
question determine what is ethical practice,
bounding, for example, what is mine from
what is ours and what is yours (e.g. Bell, 1998;
Helme, 2002; SLIM, 2004b). 
Being Purposeful
Within systems traditions two forms of behav-
iour in relation to purpose are distinguished.
One is purposeful behaviour, which
Checkland (1981) describes as behaviour
that is willed – there is thus some sense of
voluntary action. The other is purposive
behaviour – behaviour to which someone can
attribute purpose. Following the logic of the
purposeful and purposive distinctions, sys-
tems that can be seen to have an imposed
purpose that they seek to achieve are called
purposive systems and those that can be seen
to articulate their own purpose(s) as well as
seek them are purposeful systems. One of the
key features attributed to purposeful systems is
that the people in them can pursue the same
purpose, sometimes called a what, in different
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environments by pursuing different behav-
iours, sometimes called a how. Note that I have
deliberately not used the term goals, because
of the current propensity to see goals as quite
narrowly defined objectives. Certainly this
was the way they were interpreted in the sys-
tems engineering tradition of the 1950s and
1960s and in the traditional OR paradigm
(Figure 9.2; Table 9.2). My understanding of
purposefulness is not a commitment to a deter-
ministic form of rationalism because I recog-
nize that in our daily living we do what we do
and then, in reflection, make claims for what
was done.3 Being rational is a particular emo-
tional predisposition; in doing big ‘R’ research
it makes sense to me to act as if sustained ratio-
nality were possible. As I outlined earlier, an as
if attitude signals epistemological awareness, a
taking of responsibility, and is a means to
avoid unhelpful dualisms.
So another feature of systemic action
research is the extent to which there is some
purposeful engagement with the history of
systems thinking. If a system is conceptual-
ized as a result of the purposeful behaviour
of a group of interested observers, it can be
said to emerge out of the conversations and
actions of those involved. It is these conver-
sations that produce the purpose and hence
the conceptualization of the system. What it is
and what its measures of performance are will
be determined by the stakeholders involved.
This process has many of the characteristics
attributed to self-organizing systems; its
enactment can, in reflection, usefully be con-
sidered as a ‘learning system’ (Blackmore,
2005).
Being aware of purpose and being able to
ask about and articulate purposes can be a
powerful process in AR. 
Using Systems Tools, Techniques
and Methods in AR
Within systems practice, a tool is usually
something abstract, such as a diagram, used
in carrying out a pursuit, effecting a purpose,
or facilitating an activity. Technique is con-
cerned with both the skill and ability of doing
or achieving something and the manner of its
execution, such as drawing a diagram in a
prescribed manner. An example of technique
in this sense might be drawing a systems map
to a specified set of conventions.
Several authors and practitioners have
emphasized the significance of the term
methodologies rather than methods in relation
to systems. A method is used as a given, much
like following a recipe in a recipe book,
whereas a methodology can be adapted by a
particular user in a participatory situation.
There is a danger in treating methodologies as
reified entities – things in the world – rather
than as a practice that arises from what is done
in a given situation. A methodology in these
terms is both the result of and the process of
inquiry where neither theory nor practice take
precedence (Checkland, 1985). For me, a
methodology involves the conscious braiding
of theory and practice in a given context (Ison
and Russell, 2000). A systems practitioner,
aware of a range of systems distinctions (con-
cepts) and having a toolbox of techniques at
their disposal (e.g. drawing a systems map)
as well as systems methods designed by
others, is able to judge what is appropriate for
a given context in terms of managing a
process (Table 9.4). In Table 9.4 I list a range
of diagramming tools which are introduced to
systems students in OU courses as a means of
engaging with complex situations. We have
found these effective components of a systems
practitioner’s set of ‘tools’; they can be used
equally effective in AR.
Behind all systems methods there has gen-
erally been a champion, a promoter aided by
countless co-workers, students, etc. To para-
phrase the French sociologist of technology,
Bruno Latour: we are never confronted with
a systems method, but with a gamut of
weaker and stronger associations; thus
understanding what a method is, is the same
task as understanding who the people are.
This is the logic that underpins Figure 9.2.
A method, like any social technology,
depends on many people working with it,
developing and refining it, using it, taking it
up, recommending it, and above all finding it
useful. But not all technologies that succeed
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Table 9.4 Some forms of systems diagramming taught to Open University systems students
for engaging with situations of complexity and the systems concepts associated with each
(see Table 9.1)
Diagram type Purpose Systems concepts employed or revealed
Systems map To make a snapshot of elements in • Boundary judgements
a situation at a given moment • Levels – system, sub-system, supra-system
• Environment
• Elements and their relationships
Influence To explore patterns of influence in • Connectivity via influence
a situation; precursor to dynamic • System dynamics
modelling
Multiple cause Explore understandings of • Worldview about causality
causality in a situation • Positive and negative feedback
Rich pictures Unstructured picture of a situation • Systemic complexity
• Reveals mental models and metaphors
• Can reveal emotional and political elements
of situation
Control model To explore how control may • Feedback
operate in a situation • Control action
• Purpose
• Measures of performance
are the best – it depends on who builds the
better networks, particularly of practitioners.
As you experience the use of a particular
systems method and strive to make it a
methodology, it is important to reflect on it
critically – to judge it against criteria mean-
ingful to you but above all to judge it in rela-
tion to your practice of it. It will be your
experience of using an approach in a situa-
tion to which it fits that matters.
CONCLUSION
I have outlined some of the lineages which
give rise to different forms of systems practice
and what I consider to be involved in being
systemic or systematic in relation to AR. For
me, what we judge to be systems practice
arises in social relations as part of daily life,
but only when a connection has been made
with the history of systems thinking as
depicted in (but not restricted to) Figure 9.2. In
practical terms systems practice can arise
when we reflect on our own actions and make
personal claims (purposeful behaviour) or
when others observe actions that they would
explain in reference to the history of systems
thinking (purposive behaviour). From this per-
spective what is accepted (or not accepted) as
systems practice arises in social relations as
part of the praxis of daily living. With this
explanation someone who at first knew little
of the history but had experiences of systems
practice, appreciative inquiry, participatory
action research, collaborative inquiry etc. as
having many similarities could, through
inquiry which linked with the histories, or lin-
eages, begin to make finer distinctions of the
sort that practitioners from each of these tradi-
tions had embodied. That is, I can recognize
that in their doings different practitioners are
bringing forth different traditions of under-
standing. In recognizing systems practice it
would be usual that some engagement with,
and use of, the concepts listed in Tables 9.1,
9.2 or 9.3 would be experienced. 
NOTES
1 Magnus Ramage kindly drew my attention to a
nice anecdote from a conversation between
Margaret Mead and Gregory Bateson (both Macy
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attendees), suggesting that Lewin’s initial participa-
tion but early death was directly responsible for the
introduction of ‘feedback’ into popular vocabulary in
its rather loose sense – http://www.oikos.org/forgod.
htm. Lewin is also sometimes described as a teacher
of Chris Argyris (e.g. by Umpleby and Dent, 1999),
but Lewin simply taught an undergraduate module
that Argyris attended along with lots of others. 
2 As evidence of this I cite the animated discus-
sions within a forum run by Peter Reason and Fritjof
Capra at the 2005 UK Systems Society Conference in
Oxford.
3 For example, I would claim that intention arises
in reflection and is not an a priori condition.
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